Monday, October 17, 2005

In order to understand the foreign policy of the contemporary Azerbaijan Republic , one needs to provide a historical depth to its geopolitical situation. This land which lays at the intersection of historically significant land and sea routes transversing the Caucasus from north to south and from east to west has been throughout recorded human history a contested ground between rising and declining empires, religious geographical entities such as Caliphates and ideological systems such as Communism. Religiously today -Azerbaijan is a predominantly Shiite society (60%), while the dominant ethnic element of the Azerbaijani Republic is Turkic both in cultural and linguistic terms. However, the population of Azerbaijan has a complex ethnic and linguistic composition and it experienced profound influence of Persian and Russian cultures.
According to one Azerbaijani historian, medieval Arab historians characterized Azerbaijan as “originally Turkic lands” citing Hun, Khazar, Kipchak, Sabir and other Turkic tribes, which populated northern and southern valleys of Azerbaijan. At the same time Aliyev acknowledges that Caucasian Albanians, Udins, Gargars, Hanalygs, Lezgis, Persian-speaking Azeris, Tats, Talyshs, Kurds and other peoples historically populated these territories.
During the first Caliphate Arabs conducted a far-reaching policy of Arab settlement in Azerbaijan to fortify their influence in the area. (Ibid,p.205) Only in the 11 century a massive infusion of Oguz Turks (Seljukides) from Southern Azerbaijan determines the pre-dominantly Turkic character of Azerbaijani society. Official sanction by Caliphate installed Togrul-bek as the Sultan in 1050 and confirmed him as a Turkic sovereign of these lands. One of Seljuk possessions was the Emirate of Shirvan which preserved a semi-independent status during the rule of Yazidid and Kesranid dynasties in the high Middle Ages from 799 to 1204. It is noteworthy that up to the end of nineteenth century these lands were still identified as Shirvan on western maps, while Persian northern territories were identified as Aderbagan or Aderbaijan. Under Qajar Nadir Quli Khan these territories were integrated into a single Vilayet (Province) of Azerbaijan that stretched from the Erevani Khanate to Derbend in 1736. This Vilayet also included Shirvan, Qarabakh, Tebriz Azerbaijan and Chuchur-Saad beglarbeylik. Since 1204 these lands were ruled by a succession of Mongol Ilkhanides, Baghdad ruling dynasty of Jalayrides, Timurid Empire, the Turkic Kara-Koylu and later Ak-Koylu empires, Ottoman Empire ruled these lands for a relatively short period of 53 years, while a prominent Persian Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) ruled the northern Azerbaijan for 114 years. Russia threatened the region since the first Peter the Great’ conquest of northern shore of the Caspian basin, including Derbent and Baku, of 1722 until the complete integration into the Russian Empire by the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813. Thus Azerbaijan was a colony of a Western power, i.e. Russia, for the longest period among Muslim societies and thus exposed to Westernization for at least 171 years.
In particular enlightening in understanding the fluidity of Azerbaijani foreign policy after the independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 is the analysis of the historical situation in which the Khanate of Shirvan, a proto-independent Azerbaijani political entity on the territory of modern republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani society found itself under push- and-pull of similar foreign forces almost three hundred years ago when a neighboring empire, of which the Azerbaijani lands have been for a good part of previous twelve hundred years, i.e. the Persian Empire, collapsed into a number of fiefdoms or khanates. At the end of the Cold War, the same the regional rivals, Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, and Persian Empire clashed in struggle, if not for direct control over the lands, then at least for vassalage of local rulers, khans. Obvious differences should be noted that it was the Soviet empire, which disintegrated in 1991, instead of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the successor of Persian Empire. A new dominant Western power, the United States, which replaced the British Empire in the global competion, arose in the aftermath of the World War II and recently turned its gaze onto the Caucasus.
With the Safavid dynasty entering its terminal stage at the end of 17 century, its dominion in Azerbaijan was challenged by the rebellion of a local ruler Haja Davud from Quba. Haja Davud originally appealed for help to nobility of Daghestan and its Russian imperial neighbor. The call for Russian assitance was to no avail, but the Dagestani Surhay Khan joined the rebellion against Persia in 1721. The troops of Haja Davud raided a provincial capital of Shamahy. During this attack many Russian merchants were marauded and their possessions and interests were damaged. These events gave Russia a pretext to get involved in Azerbaijani affairs. The expanding young Empire of Peter the Great saw an opportunity to lay a claim to a frontier of crumbling Persian Empire. Haja Davud forged an alliance of convenience with Ottoman Empire against Persia and Russia. He reinforced his position in Shamahy and claimed Shirvan Khanate that was recognized by a firman of Ottoman Sultan Ahmet the III. Sultan sent expeditionary force of Sari Mustafa Pasha to support the independence of Shirvan Khanate from Persian and Russian encroachments. In response, Peter the Great issued a Manifesto which threatened to punish rebellious Haja Davud and Surhay Khan of Kazikumyk. He accused both if mutiny against his friend a brother Shah. Peter promised to restore peace and tranquility to the people of the region. According to Azerbaijani historian this Manifesto was a first printed publication an Azerbaijani language. Emperor Peter’s flotilla set sail from Astrakhan in July of 1722.
Ravaged by chaos of the misrule in Persian empire and lack of security produced by onslaughts of Daghestani abreks, the local population and nobility was very receptive to Russian Emperor and his advancing troops which after Peter’s departure to St. Petersburg occupied Baku and Apsheron peninsular. Meanwhile a new pretender to Persian throne Tahmassib the II sent an embassy led by Ismail-bek to St. Petersburg with instructions to cede Derbend, Baku and adjacent territories. Russian military mission in Resht held up Ismail-bek’s mission until the Russian troops occupied these territories.
Ottoman Sultan responded by sending his Turkish expeditionary force to relieve Haja Davud. The Turkish army occupied Tbilisi and began its march towards Shemahy. The Russian army and navy were ordered to occupy Baku promptly before the advance of Russian Army. After the Baku Khan Muhammed Huseyn refused to surrender, the Russian navy began bombardment. On July 27, 1723, the Baku fortress fell to the Russian arms. Meanwhile, the Persian Ambassador was held at the Russian court in St. Petersburg and was compelled to sign on behalf of Persian Shah an agreement which stated” ..His Shakh Majesty cedes into permanent ownership of his Royal Majesty the Emperor of All Russia cities of Derbend, Baku with all possessions and the lands adjacent to the Caspian sea as well as provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Astrabad for deployment of the troops which His Imperial Majesty sends to Shakh’s Majesty against mutineers for his assistance, without demanding monetary reward.” It was co-signed by Ismail-bek on September 12, 1722.
In the early 18 century Russia exhausted by the wars in the west desired to avoid a direct confrontation with Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus. As a result, in July of 1724 the Istanbul Treaty was signed with the Ottoman Sultan. This agreement confirmed independence of Shirvan Khanate (the terrirory of modern Azerbaijani state). The Treaty stipulated that Turkish Army could not be deployed on the territory of Shirvan, unless agreed with Russia. This agreement delineated the spheres of imperial control between the two powers. Thus Russia retained her dominant role on the Caspian littoral, but was obliged not to interfere in the rest of Transcaucasia and South Azerbaijan. As a result the Ottoman Empire captured Ganja, Tebriz, Hoy and Ardabil.
Haja Davud, the Khan of Quba, disappointed the Ottomans by his independent stance and secret negotiations with Russia and was deposed in May of 1728. He was replaced by Surhay-Khan, an Ottoman puppet. By 1730s, the Azerbaijani lands became again the theatre of the Ottoman-Persian rivalry. Russia exposed to pressure from France and England sought an understanding with a new regime in Persia, where Nadir Kuli-Khan became the military commander. A new peace treaty was signed in Resht on Janury 21 of 1732. By this treaty Russia ceded all possessions up to the Kura river back to Persia. After reaching agreement with Russia, Nadir Kuli-Khan overthrew the Safavid Takhmassib the II, and declared himself a regent of his eight-year old son Abbas the III. The Ottoman army retreated under Iranian pressure. Russia solidified its alliance with Persia by committing itself never to provide assistance to Turkey in case of Iranian military action in Transcaucasia. In the summer of 1734 Nadir Kuli-Khan advanced and occupied Shirvan, but encountered a strong resisatnce in Ganja. In order solidify his military gains Nadir Khan signed the Ganja Treaty with Russia in 1735. After this the Ottoman army left the territory of Transcaucasia.
The numerous military victories of Nadir Khan provided him with an opportunity to seize power in Iran. He murdered weakened, the last scion of Safavid dynasty, and was crowned as new Shakh of Persia. He re-organized Shirvan, Qarabagh, Tebriz and Chuhur-Saad beglerbeylic into a unified Vilayet of Azerbaijan. He nominated his brother Ibragim-Khan as the ruler of the new Vilayet. Thus Azerbaijan was reintegrated into Persian Empire. Hence, historical record explains strong pull which Iran is capable of exercising over the republic of Azerbaijan.

Friday, October 14, 2005

Azerbaijani-Israeli relations: Movies are just not enough.

In view of the American Greater Middle East initiative aimed at the promotion of democracy, development and support of nascent democracies such as Azerbaijan in the recently expanded Middle East, there is a welcome sign of cultural exchanges between Israel and Azerbaijan. The first Israeli Film Festival organized by the Israeli Cultural Centre and the Sokhnut World Jewish Organization was held in Baku on March 9-12, 2004. But the second pillar of this initiative also calls for reinvigoration in the Israeli vision of its relations with Azerbaijan. As a positive development in this direction, an Israeli delegation, which included government officials and representatives of the Israeli company Meigal, visited Baku on 2-5 March, 2004. Meigal specializes in modern technologies that purge, treat and recycle water. At a press conference in Baku on March 5 held by the Israeli delegation Azerbaijani government officials said that Azerbaijan is interested in buying Israeli water management technologies and installing them at several industrial enterprises because of Israeli rich experience in purging and recycling drinking water. However, this could be only a first step in bilateral cooperation in water management field since Azerbaijan has more than 100 industrial estates on its Caspian coastline, which is 825 km long. Azerbaijani government encourages small and medium-size enterprises and industrial estates to buy Israeli equipment to prevent water pollution of the rivers Kura and Arax as well as its Caspian littoral. An Azerbaijani official from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources said,” In ten years, we can equip 30% of the industrial sector of the country with those devices.”

An Israeli expert, Efraim Inbar, who was involved in contacts with the Azerbaijani leadership in the late 1990s, in an interview with the JTA, indicated that there were many similarities between Israel and Azerbaijan such as, "Fear of Iran and radical Islam; suspicion of Russia; friendship with Turkey, and a desire to be part of the West." About 40,000 Azerbaijani Jews have immigrated to Israel. They are familiar with the language, culture and traditions of Azerbaijani people who are historically friendly to the Jews. This community can serve as a great resource for Israeli businesses, which are considering to make investments in Azerbaijan.

Even though the strategic imperatives of the geopolitical situation of the Caucasus have not changed, but there have been many changes in the economic sphere and investment climate in Azerbaijan. With the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in July of 2005, Azerbaijan becomes an important producer of oil and gas for the international market. Oil Transnational Corporations have committed $60 billion to the development of the Azerbaijani oil and gas resources. The Azerbaijani government will reinvest a significant part of these hard currency profits in non-oil sectors of economy. President Ilham Aliyev signed into a law a decree on socio-economic regional development for 2004-2008. The Azerbaijani leadership expects to fund this program through a mix of private investment and foreign loans from international banks, grants from multilateral organizations and foreign aide agencies. It is estimated that regions of Azerbaijan will receive infusions of state investment estimated to reach 16,8 billion US $ over 4 year period. Azerbaijan today is experiencing a construction boom. Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijani parliament) enacted legislation last summer that facilitates further privatization of several sectors of the Azerbaijani economy and guarantee the internationally required standards of transparency.

As this example in the water management field shows an increased economic cooperation and improved trade relations between the two countries will bring mutual benefit. There is a unique window of opportunity for Israeli state and private sector to re-assess the potential of Azerbaijan for bilateral cooperation and direct investment. Israel has already missed an opportunity to participate in the first wave of privatization of the banking industry, which has been completed in April of 2004. If Israeli decision-makers and businessman will not focus on the economic opportunities in this friendly Muslim country in a strategically important corner of the world, it will be a grave miscalculation.
On the diplomatic front, there are signs that Azerbaijani-Israeli relations are about to enter a qualitatively different stage. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Israel in 1992, Israel opened its embassy in Baku, however, under the cautious leadership of Heydar Aliyev, weary of pressure from its southern neighbor and the Conference of Islamic States, Azerbaijani leadership has tarried in opening its embassy in Israel. This was an unresolved issue, clearly unsettling in relations between the two countries. Now, young Ilham Aliyev, who represents a new unambiguously Western-oriented generation of the post-Soviet leaders, has taken over. There seems to be movement in resolving of this thorny issue. In an interview with the press before leaving Moscow in February of 2004, Ilham Aliyev intimated that among the 20 new embassies, which Azerbaijani leadership intends to open, Israel will be on the priority list. It is up to Israel's government to follow this initiative and forge new alliances in a changed world paradigm, one that could become an important bridge in creating new allies for its new challenges.