LALE KEMAL loglu@todayszaman.com Columnists Turkey’s entente with Israel in serious jeopardy
The Turkish-Israeli relationship, celebrated in the mid 1990s as an emerging Muslim-Jewish alliance in a “hostile” Middle East, has been deteriorating with increasing speed since Israel’s assault on Gaza that began in December 2008 and continued into January 2009.
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Furthermore, an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla in the Mediterranean Sea on May 31 of this year left nine Turks dead and marked a turning point in the further deterioration of the relationship between the two. This raised question marks over the impact of the strained relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv in the Middle East as well as in Turkey’s ties with its close ally, the US, which also needs Turkish cooperation in both Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in the strategic Black Sea region.
In an attempt to have Israel meet Turkish demands, such as offering an apology for its raid on the Turkish ship and killing nine Turks, Turkey has continued to impose gradual sanctions on Israel. Cancelling three joint military maneuvers with Israel, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told reporters in Canada last Monday that Turkey had imposed a ban on Israeli military flights in Turkish airspace.
But Turkey has so far been reluctant to impose defense industry-related sanctions on Israel, mainly because Ankara, lacking military technology, has become heavily dependent on Israeli military systems. Turkish diplomatic sources earlier told a group of Turkish journalists that Turkey has to be careful before taking any steps on imposing an embargo on Israeli military technology because some systems -- such as F-4 and F-5 fighters as well as M-60 tanks, upgraded by Israel -- will in the future require spare parts from Israel.
An ongoing project with Israel worth about $160 million and concerning the Israeli supply of electro-optical reconnaissance pods for Turkish F-4s is currently in jeopardy. Israel is expected to not supply Turkey with the system out of a fear that Turkish F-4s may later gather reconnaissance info on Israel. Such speculation underscores a serious loss of trust between the two countries, mainly in defense industry cooperation.
Alexander Murinson recalls that Israel was able to offer Turkey in the early 1990s military cooperation without undue attention to human rights observance and also served as a conduit for American political echelons, i.e., the US Congress, which approves funding for American foreign aid and arms sales.
(Murinson, “Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State identity and security in the Middle East and Caucasus,” Routledge, 2010)
He goes on to say that the strategic Turkish-Israeli-Azerbaijani axis is bound to dissolve as the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government realigns Turkish foreign policy in the direction of greater cohesion with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Murinson quotes Israeli journalist Yoav Karny as saying, “The close strategic partnership which developed between Turkey and Israel came into being because generals took this subject out of jurisdiction of government.”
I have a reservation over Murinson’s observation, namely, that the Turkish-Israeli axis is bound to dissolve as the AK Party government realigns Turkish foreign policy in the direction of greater cohesion with its Middle Eastern neighbors. In my opinion, on the Turkish side, common sense will prevail in a way that the ruling AK Party will prevent an increased perception in the world that Turkey has been associating itself too much with the Muslim cause in the Middle East rather than seeing it as a case of conflict resolution.
On the other hand, one of the biggest problems behind deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations has been the limited influence that the political authorities had in forging military and defense industry cooperation deals with Tel Aviv in the mid 1990s. As Karny observed, the strategic cooperation between the two countries came into being because generals took this subject out of the jurisdiction of government.
The more Turkish political authorities have attempted to put under their control the decision-making mechanism, the more Turkish-Israeli military cooperation was questioned by the majority Muslim Turkish society, which was already skeptical about Israel.
Meanwhile, a major part of responsibility lies with Israel in normalizing relations with Turkey, too, accepting the fact that the Turkish military’s central role in decision making is declining.
01 July 2010, Thursday
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/75-lale-kemal.html
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Furthermore, an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla in the Mediterranean Sea on May 31 of this year left nine Turks dead and marked a turning point in the further deterioration of the relationship between the two. This raised question marks over the impact of the strained relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv in the Middle East as well as in Turkey’s ties with its close ally, the US, which also needs Turkish cooperation in both Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in the strategic Black Sea region.
In an attempt to have Israel meet Turkish demands, such as offering an apology for its raid on the Turkish ship and killing nine Turks, Turkey has continued to impose gradual sanctions on Israel. Cancelling three joint military maneuvers with Israel, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told reporters in Canada last Monday that Turkey had imposed a ban on Israeli military flights in Turkish airspace.
But Turkey has so far been reluctant to impose defense industry-related sanctions on Israel, mainly because Ankara, lacking military technology, has become heavily dependent on Israeli military systems. Turkish diplomatic sources earlier told a group of Turkish journalists that Turkey has to be careful before taking any steps on imposing an embargo on Israeli military technology because some systems -- such as F-4 and F-5 fighters as well as M-60 tanks, upgraded by Israel -- will in the future require spare parts from Israel.
An ongoing project with Israel worth about $160 million and concerning the Israeli supply of electro-optical reconnaissance pods for Turkish F-4s is currently in jeopardy. Israel is expected to not supply Turkey with the system out of a fear that Turkish F-4s may later gather reconnaissance info on Israel. Such speculation underscores a serious loss of trust between the two countries, mainly in defense industry cooperation.
Alexander Murinson recalls that Israel was able to offer Turkey in the early 1990s military cooperation without undue attention to human rights observance and also served as a conduit for American political echelons, i.e., the US Congress, which approves funding for American foreign aid and arms sales.
(Murinson, “Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State identity and security in the Middle East and Caucasus,” Routledge, 2010)
He goes on to say that the strategic Turkish-Israeli-Azerbaijani axis is bound to dissolve as the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government realigns Turkish foreign policy in the direction of greater cohesion with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Murinson quotes Israeli journalist Yoav Karny as saying, “The close strategic partnership which developed between Turkey and Israel came into being because generals took this subject out of jurisdiction of government.”
I have a reservation over Murinson’s observation, namely, that the Turkish-Israeli axis is bound to dissolve as the AK Party government realigns Turkish foreign policy in the direction of greater cohesion with its Middle Eastern neighbors. In my opinion, on the Turkish side, common sense will prevail in a way that the ruling AK Party will prevent an increased perception in the world that Turkey has been associating itself too much with the Muslim cause in the Middle East rather than seeing it as a case of conflict resolution.
On the other hand, one of the biggest problems behind deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations has been the limited influence that the political authorities had in forging military and defense industry cooperation deals with Tel Aviv in the mid 1990s. As Karny observed, the strategic cooperation between the two countries came into being because generals took this subject out of the jurisdiction of government.
The more Turkish political authorities have attempted to put under their control the decision-making mechanism, the more Turkish-Israeli military cooperation was questioned by the majority Muslim Turkish society, which was already skeptical about Israel.
Meanwhile, a major part of responsibility lies with Israel in normalizing relations with Turkey, too, accepting the fact that the Turkish military’s central role in decision making is declining.
01 July 2010, Thursday
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/75-lale-kemal.html
Labels: The Turkish-Israeli relationship
posted by Alexander Murinson at 12:18 PM
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